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COMMENT
ADVERSE SPOUSAL TESTIMONY IN MARYLAND
AND THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
"When one spouse is willing to testify against the other in
a criminal proceeding - whatever the motivation - their
relationship is almost certainly in disrepair; there is prob-
ably little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege
to preserve. In these circumstances, a rule of evidence
that permits an accused to prevent adverse spousal testi-
mony seems far more likely to frustrate justice than to
foster family peace.' 1
I. INTRODUCTION
When faced with the dilemma of whether to admit adverse
spousal testimony, courts and legislatures have reasoned for cen-
turies that concern for the sanctity of the marital relationship out-
weighs the necessity of obtaining all relevant evidence in a case.
Although society's changing attitude toward marriage has not
tipped the scales from total incompetence of a witness-spouse to
unlimited admission of spousal testimony, the majority of juris-
dictions now regard the matter in terms of a limited privilege.
Maryland, by legislative enactment,2 and the federal courts, by
virtue of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Trammel v. United States,3 now concur in the view that the
balance has shifted in favor of admitting the voluntary testimony
of a witness-spouse on all matters except those disclosed in priv-
ileged marital communications. This comment traces the common
law and statutory limitations on spousal testimony and the priv-
ileges presently applied in Maryland and the Fourth Circuit.4
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins
Any discussion of the origins of modern day spousal priv-
ilege must address the attitude of common law society toward the
marital relationship. The head of the household in Elizabethan
England was viewed as the king of his castle, and an injury to him
1. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980).
2. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-105 to -106 (1980).
3. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
4. The scope of this comment is limited to Maryland and the Fourth Circuit. For a com-
pilation of state statutes regarding the admissibility of spousal testimony, see 2 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMORE].
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by a family member or servant constituted the crime of petit
treason.' Society was no more willing to condone a husband's loss
of life or property, by court judgment obtained through the aid of
his wife's testimony, than it was willing to allow her to take that
same life or property through independent action.
6
To add to what has been called the "tantalizing obscurity"
clouding the origin of rules against spousal testimony,7 one must
also look at the seventeenth century rule disqualifying an inter-
ested party from testifying in common law courts.' A party to an
action could not testify on his own behalf, based on the belief that
he would be inclined to commit perjury to further his cause.9
Because a husband and wife were considered one person, with no
separate legal existence,lo common law courts extended this dis-
qualification to the party's spouse.1
Despite the demise of both the offense of petit treason and the
disqualification for interest, courts continued to exclude the testi-
mony of one spouse for or against the other. Judges were appar-
ently reluctant to abandon the rationales previously asserted in
support of spousal incompetence. s Some courts justified this dis-
qualification based on the "legal policy of marriage." 3 Husband
and wife were considered "two souls in one person,' ' 14 their inter-
ests were viewed as identical, and the natural bias of spouses was
5. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2227 (J. McNaughten rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as 8
WIGMORE]; Comment, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Philosophy in a
Modern World, 7 CuM. L. REV. 307, 310 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Questioning].
6. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442-45; Questioning, supra note 5, at 310.
7. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2227.
8. See generally 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 575-587.
9. E.g., Coleman's Trial, 7 Eng. St. Tr. 1, 65 (1678). Dean Wigmore reduced the policy
behind the disqualification to the following syllogism:
Total exclusion from the stand is the proper safeguard against a false deci-
sion, whenever the persons offered are of a class specially likely to speak
falsely; persons having a pecuniary interest in the event of the cause are
specially likely to speak falsely; therefore such persons should be totally
excluded.
2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 576.
10. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442; E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LIrLETON
*6b; C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCoR-
MICK]. For an interesting account of the restrictions imposed on marital partners, in
general, during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century in England, see J.
WALTHOE, BARON AND FEME (London 1700).
11. See, e.g., Bentley v. Cooke, 99 Eng. Rep. 729 (K.B. 1784). See generally 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 4, §§ 600-620.
12. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228.
13. F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT Nisi PRIUS *286; 8
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228.
14. "A wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, quia sunt duae animae
in came una .... " E. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON *6b.
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thought to encourage one to commit perjury on the other's
behalf.1 5 In addition, society had an aversion to the idea of com-
pelling one spouse to testify against the other, thereby subjecting
the couple to public humiliation.1 6 The courts also feared that any
interference on their part might disturb marital harmony and
infringe upon the confidential relationship between husband and
wife.17 This final rationale is the one courts continue to absert to
justify their application of modern spousal privilege.1s
Common law courts recognized an exception to this exclusion-
ary rule when spousal testimony was a "necessity" for the fair ad-
ministration of justice.1 9 In particular, courts were reluctant to
allow a husband "a vested license to injure [his wife] in secret with
complete immunity.''20 Therefore, a wife was permitted to testify
in criminal prosecutions for personal injuries inflicted upon her by
her husband. 1 Furthermore, reasoning that the "tie of allegiance"
to the king was "more obligatory than any other, ' 22 some courts
also recognized an exception to the rule in the case of high
treason.
23
Spousal incompetence and the exception for necessity sur-
vived virtually unchallenged for approximately two hundred
years.2 4 However, Jeremy Bentham, an early critic of this exclu-
sionary rule, forecast the later decline of what he viewed as a
15. See, e.g., Davis v. Dinwoody, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B. 1792). See also 1 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *443; 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 601; Moser, Compell-
ability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases, 15 MD. L. REV.
16, 18 (1955); 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 359 (1952).
16. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228; Questioning, supra note 5, at 310.
17. Stapleton v. Crofts, 118 Eng. Rep. 137, 138 (1852); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228;
Questioning, supra note 5, at 308.
18. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Harris v. State, 37 Md.
App. 180, 183, 376 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1977). See also McCoRMICK, supra note 10, § 66; 8
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228; Comment, The Husband-Wife Evidentiary Privilege
in Criminal Proceedings, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 74, 76 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Husband-Wife]; Questioning, supra note 5, at 312-13; 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 361 (1952).
19. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2239.
20. Id
21. Id.; see, e.g., Dominus Rex. v. Azire, 93 Eng. Rep. 746 (K.B. 1725); Lord Audley's
Trial, 3 Eng. St. Tr. 401 (K.B. 1631). The court in Lord Audley's Trial admitted a
wife's testimony to prove the rape upon her at the instigation and with the assistance
of her husband, by stating: "[In] civil cases the Wife may not [be a competent witness
against her husband]; but in a criminal cause of this nature, where the wife is the
party grieved, and on whom the crime is committed, she is to be admitted [as] a
witness against her husband." Id. at 414.
22. F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS *286.
23. Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 Eng. St. Tr. 555, 644 (K.B. 1684); F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS *286; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, §
2239. Contra Anonymous, 1 Brownl & Gold 47, 123 Eng. Rep. 656 (C.P. 1613).
24. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2227-2228.
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license given to a husband to commit "all sorts of wickedness, in
the presence of or with the assistance of his wife .... -"5 Until soci-
ety's changing views on marriage and the individual rights of
marital partners forced courts to alter the rule, Bentham stood
virtually alone in his crusade against securing every man with a
"safe accomplice.' '26
B. Changing Attitudes
The industrial revolution precipitated the breakdown of the
family as a self-sufficient socio-economic unit and the dissolution
of the bonds that tied husband and wife together in the eyes of the
law.21 A significant step toward the legal and economic autonomy
of wives occurred in the mid-nineteenth century when legislatures
began to pass Married Women's Property Acts.2 Shortly there-
after in civil actions29 and somewhat later in criminal
proceedings,30 the absolute disqualification of a witness-spouse
was transformed by most jurisdictions into a narrower privilege.
In more recent years, with the entry of increasing numbers of
women into the work force and the disappearance of the stigma
previously associated with divorce 3 1 the fear of disturbing con-
nubial bliss has become an anachronism. Consequently, in the
area of spousal privilege, as with many other archaic rules,32
courts and legislatures have altered the law in accordance with the
changing views of modern society toward the sanctity of the
marital relationship.
C. Rules Excluding Spousal Testimony
Three distinct rules affect the admissibility of spousal testi-
mony: the total incompetence of a witness-spouse as applied at
25. 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 327, 340 (1827). The full passage is
as follows:
Let us, therefore, grant to every man a license to commit all sorts of wicked-
ness, in the presence and with the assistance of his wife: let us secure to
every man in the bosom of his family, and in his own bosom, a safe accom-
plice: let us make every man's house his castle; and, as far as depends upon
us, let us convert that castle into a den of thieves.
Id
26. Id.
27. V. TUFFLE'& B. MYERHOFF, CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 336 (1979); Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L.
REV. 675, 788-89 (1929).
28. See V. TUFFLE & B. MYERHOFF, CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 336(1979). See also
I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY §§ 2:1-:3 (1973).
29. E.g., Law of March 2, 1864, ch. 109, §§ 1, 3, 1864 Md. Laws 136.
30. E.g., Law of April 5, 1888, ch. 545, § 1, 1888 Md. Laws 895.
31. V. TUFFLE & B. MYERHOFF, CHANGING IMAGES OF THE FAMILY 319-60 (1979); 8
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law
of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675, 678-79 (1929).
32. E.g., Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). For a discussion of Lusby, in
which the Court of Appeals of Maryland modified the doctrine of interspousal tort
immunity, see 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 584 (1979).
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common law; the privilege against testimony regarding private
marital communications; and the privilege against adverse testi-
mony in general (the anti-marital facts privilege). Every state has
provided statutory guidance to the courts in their jurisdictions,
indicating which of these rules are applicable to exclude spousal
testimony.3 Although these exclusionary rules may serve the sub-
stantive goal of promoting marital harmony and confidence, their
application often results in the sacrifice of valuable evidence.34 To
avoid such sacrifice, courts have created exceptions when
necessary,3 5 and legislatures have modified or abrogated the appli-
cation of these rules.
36
Incompetency and privilege differ both in justification and
application. 7 A judicial disqualification of a witness, based on his
incompetence, is intrinsic to the litigation and conclusively
establishes that the witness' testimony can be given no probative
value. If the court accepts a party's assertion that a witness is
incompetent to testify, his incompetence cannot thereafter be
waived. The majority of jurisdictions have rendered spouses fully
competent to testify for or against each other in civil cases. s Fur-
thermore, the disqualification of husbands and wives to testify
favorably in criminal proceedings has disappeared entirely.3 9
Finally, although a few jurisdictions continue to view adverse
spousal testimony in criminal cases as incompetent, 40 the majority
of jurisdictions, which have not totally abolished this exclusion-
ary rule41 now consider such testimony privileged.4 2 The justifica-
tion for the application of a privilege is extrinsic to the litigation
33. See statutes compiled in 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
34. The Advisory Committee, which developed the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence,
recognized that the purpose of privilege rules is "extrinsic to litigation," hampering
any determination of truth in order to protect certain confidences and relationships. 2
J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 501[011, at 501-13 (1979);
Nacht, Privileges in the Federal Courts-The Two Faces of Rule 501, 1978 ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 493, 493-94.
35. See text accompanying notes 155-72 infra.
36. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
37. For a discussion of the distinction between a rule of incompetency and a rule of
privilege, see MCCORMICK, supra note 10, §§ 72-74.
38. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
39. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 66.
40. Seven states continue to view spouses as incompetent to testify adversely. Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488. It
should be noted, although Trammel lists eight states, Mississippi was included
despite the fact that spouses may testify if both consent. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-5
(Supp. 1979).
41. For a list of the states that have abolished the rule against adverse spousal testi-
mony, see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980). See also 2
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
42. Twenty-five states recognize an anti-marital facts privilege. See Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
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inasmuch as it is based on the desire of courts or legislatures to
protect certain relationships and confidences.4 3 Therefore, a hus-
band or wife vested with a spousal privilege can normally waive
it." It should be noted, however, that confusion between spousal
privilege and incompetence has, on occasion, caused courts to
question the possibility of waiver.
45
The privilege against disclosure of confidential marital com-
munications is the most widely accepted of the rules on spousal
testimony.' 6 Although this privilege existed as early as the seven-
teenth century,' 7 it was not consistently applied until nineteenth
century legislatures began to abolish the disqualification of a
witness-spouse.'8 It is now applied in every state and federal court
in the United States, even in jurisdictions in which the more
general privilege against adverse spousal testimony has been
abrogated.4
9
Generally, a confidential communication is a written or oral
statement from one spouse to the other, made with the assurance
that it will be protected by the intimacy of the marital state. 0
Although the majority of jurisdictions limit the privilege to oral or
written expressions, some courts have extended the rule to in-
clude acts, when the information thereby conveyed would not
have been obtained but for the marital relationship.5 1 Moreover, a
presumption exists that any communication made between a hus-
band and wife during the marriage is privileged.52 Normally, only
the presence of a third party or other circumstances negating the
confidential nature of the communication can be offered to rebut
that presumption.
Although virtually all jurisdictions concur that the com-
municating spouse holds the confidential communications priv-
ilege,64 those jurisdictions still recognizing an anti-marital facts
43. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 72.
44. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2242; Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 83.
45. See MCCORMICK, supra note 10, §§ 72, 83.
46. See Questioning, supra note 5, at 311-12. See also 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
47. Lady Ivy's Trial, 10 Eng. St. Tr. 555, 644 (K.B. 1684).
48. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 78; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2333.
49. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488.
50. 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 361 (1952).
51. For a discussion of when an act constitutes a communication, see 8 WIGMORE, supra
note 5, § 2337; Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 78-79; Comment, Privileged Commu-
nications between Husband and Wife: Extension of the Privilege to Acts in Criminal
Cases, 47 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 205 (1956).
52. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951); Coleman v. State, 281 Md, 538, 543,
380 A.2d 49, 52 (1977); MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 80.
53. E.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1953); Master v. Master, 223 Md. 618, 166
A.2d 251 (1960).
54. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 83; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2340.
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privilege disagree as to who has standing to raise it.6" The modern
trend favors vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse; however,
many states continue to follow the traditional procedure of allow-
ing the defendant-spouse or both to claim the privilege.1
6
While privileged communications made during the marriage
remain privileged after divorce or death of the communicating
spouse,67 the anti-marital facts privilege does not survive the ter-
mination of the marital relationship. 5 The duration of the former
privilege is extended, based on the belief that in order to encour-
age marital confidences, generally, it is necessary that a com-
municating spouse be guaranteed permanent secrecy. 59 On the
other hand, the anti-marital facts privilege, aimed at preserving
domestic peace between the accused and witness-spouse, 60 under-
standably terminates when the protected relationship no longer
exists.61
Almost every jurisdiction has expanded the common law
exception for "necessity. '62 Depending on the state, spousal testi-
mony is permitted and may even be compelled3 in such areas as
crimes against the person and property of the other spouse,
crimes against the child of either or both, bigamy, rape, adultery,
and abandonment.
64
Maryland, by legislative action,6 5 and the federal courts,
through judicial interpretation of the changing common law,
66
have followed the modern evolutionary trend by significantly
limiting the exclusion of spousal testimony.
55. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980); 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, §
2241.
56. Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases,
15 MD. L. REV. 15, 19 (1955); Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 82-83.
57. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 85; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2237; Husband-Wife,
supra note 18, at 79.
58. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2237; Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 77.
59. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2341.
60. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 44 (1980); Harris v. State, 37 Md.
App. 180, 183, 376 A.2d 1144, 1145 (1977). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 66; 8
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2228; Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 76; Questioning,
supra note 5, at 312-13; 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 361 (1952).
61. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2237; Husband-Wife, supra note 18, at 77.
62. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 488; 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2239; Husband-Wife,
supra note 18, at 82-83.
63. See Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal
Cases, 15 MD. L. REV. 15, 16 (1955).
64. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2239; 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 364-65 (1952).
65. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101, -105 to -106 (1980); MD. CODE PUB.
GEN. LAWS art. 35, §§ 1, 4 (1904); Law of April 5, 1888, ch. 545, § 1, 1888 Md. Laws
895; Law of March 2, 1864, ch. 109, §§ 1, 3, 1864 Md. Laws 136.
66. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934); FED. R. EvID. 501.
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III. SPOUSAL TESTIMONY IN MARYLAND
Although early Maryland courts disqualified one spouse from
testifying for or against the other on policy grounds67 by the
beginning of the twentieth century the state legislature had statu-
torily rendered husbands and wives competent in both civil and
criminal proceedings .6 Nevertheless, a spouse continued to be
viewed as incompetent to reveal information obtained in private
marital communications 69 and could not be compelled to testify in
a criminal action.70 Except for the addition of a statutory excep-
tion compelling a husband or wife to testify in a prosecution for
the abuse of a minor child,71 the Maryland rules on the admissibil-
ity of spousal testimony have remained, for the most part, sub-
stantively unchanged since that time.
72
A. Anti-Marital Facts Privilege
Maryland vests the anti-marital facts privilege in the witness-
spouse. Section 9-106 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Code Annotated provides that in a criminal action against one
spouse, the other "may not be compelled to testify as an adverse
witness unless the charge involves the abuse of a child under
18."'T7 Therefore, in most criminal cases, when one marital partner
67. Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 93, 96 (1873); Williamson v. Morton, 2 Md. Ch. 94, 107
(1851).
68. Pursuant to chapter 109 of the 1864 Maryland Laws, a party's spouse was rendered
competent to testify in civil proceedings. Law of March 2, 1864, ch. 109, §§ 1, 3, 1864
Md. Laws 136. In 1888, the disqualification was expressly removed in criminal cases.
Law of April 5, 1888, ch. 545, § 1, 1888 Md. Laws 895. Although chapter 357 of the
1876 Maryland Laws had already implicitly removed this disqualification, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland had continued to view spouses as incompetent in criminal
proceedings, "based upon considerations of public policy, growing out of the marital
relation." Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 475-78 (1881). See Law of April 7, 1876, ch.
357, § 1, 1876 Md. Laws 601. It should be noted that the statute that rendered
spouses competent did not affect the common law rule that a husband or wife is dis-
qualified from testifying that children born during the marriage are illegitimate, i.e.,
non access by husband. Metzger v. Steamship Kirsten Torm, 245 F.Supp. 227, 233
(D. Md. 1965); Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 139 A. 318 (1938).
69. "[I]n no case, civil or criminal, shall any husband or wife be competent to disclose any
confidential communication made by one to the other during the marriage.... " MD.
CODE PUB. GEN. LAWS art. 35, § 4 (1904).
70. Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 112, 117, 63 A. 317, 319-20 (1906). Note, however, that
the statute in effect at that time did not indicate that a spouse was not compellable.
MD. CODE PUB. GEN. LAWS art. 35, §§ 1, 4 (1904). In 1964, the Maryland legislature
amended that statute to include the phrase "nor shall the husband or wife be com-
pelled to testify as an adverse party or witness in any criminal proceeding involving
his or her spouse .... " Law of May 4, 1965, ch. 835, § 1, 1965 Md. Laws 1322.
71. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1980), applied in Mulligan v. State, 6 Md.
App. 600, 252 A.2d 476 (1969).
72. Compare MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-101, -105 to -106 (1980) with MD.
CODE PUB. GEN. LAWS art. 35, §§ 1, 4 (1904).
73. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1980).
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takes the stand against the other, the trial judge should probably
advise the witness-spouse of his right to refuse to testify.
74
Almost all of the Maryland case law on the anti-marital facts
privilege has dealt with whether an exception existed in a particu-
lar factual setting. One such exception urged upon the courts has
been that husbands and wives should be compellable witnesses in
prosecutions for spousal assault. Unlike the approach in other jur-
isdictions, Maryland courts have never required spouses to testify
in such cases.76 The only exception specified in the Maryland Code
and, thereby, recognized by the courts is that one spouse may be
compelled to testify when the other has allegedly abused a minor
child.7 6 The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland applied this
statutory exception in Mulligan v. State.77 In that case, the
accused's wife was a compellable witness at her husband's trial for
the alleged murder of their soon to be adopted daughter. The court
readily extended the statutory exception for abuse 7 to a prosecu-
74. In Raymond v. State, 195 Md. 126, 72 A.2d 711 (1950), however, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland indicated that a trial court's failure to properly instruct a witness-
spouse, in such a case, does not justify habeas corpus relief. In Raymond, a husband
petitioned for habeas corpus after he had been convicted of assault and battery upon
his wife, based largely upon her testimony. In his petition, he objected to the trial
judge's failure to inform his wife of her privilege not to testify. Judge Moser of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City released the petitioner stating, "I think it is an
obligation on the part of the Court to advise the wife it is her free choice to decide
whether she wants to testify or not." Id at 128, 72 A.2d at 712. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland reversed, concluding that if the trial court erred, the petitioner could not
rely on that error because the privilege belonged to his wife alone. The court stated:
"[WIhere no fundamental right of the petitioner is involved, questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence can only be raised on direct appeal, rather than by a habeas
corpus proceeding." Id at 130, 72 A.2d at 713.
75. In Hanon v. State, 63 Md. 123 (1885), the court of appeals stated that "[tihe necessity
of permitting the wife to testify against her husband springs from the duty of pro-
tecting her person from violence, and the impunity with which from the privacy and
close relations of married life assaults upon her might otherwise be perpetrated." Id
at 127. Once the bar of incompetence was removed, however, such permission was un-
necessary. This exception was never viewed by Maryland courts, based on their inter-
pretation of the statutory prohibition against compelling spouses to testify in crim-
inal proceedings, as grounds for compelling such testimony in a case of spousal
assault. See, e.g., Metz v. State, 9 Md. App. 15, 262 A.2d 331 (1970).
76. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1980). The statutory exception involves
"a child under 18" and does not, as in other jurisdictions, require the child to be
related to either the defendant or witness-spouse. Compare id with 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 4. § 488.
77. 6 Md. App. 600, 252 A.2d 476 (1969).
78. The statutory exception that allowed a court to compel a spouse's testimony then
read: "except when such proceedings involves [sic] the abuse of a child under sixteen
years pursuant to Section 1 lA of Article 27 of this Code, as amended from time to
time ... " Law of April 14, 1967, ch. 176, § 1, 1967 Md. Laws 291, quoted in Mulligan
v. State, 6 Md. App. 600, 615, 252 A.2d 476, 485 (1969).
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tion for murder due to the fact that the defendant's "malicious
mistreatment" of the child was found to have caused her death. 9
His actions were therefore among those prohibited under the
Maryland child abuse statute.80
Although Maryland courts may not compel spousal testimony
in cases not involving child abuse, such evidence may be admitted
through another source. For example, in Metz v. State, 81 the court
of special appeals ruled that voluntary statements offered by a
wife to the police concerning her husband's assault upon her were
admissible, despite the fact that she had asserted her privilege not
to testify in court. The court strictly construed the language of
the statute "to mean exactly what it says, that a husband or wife
shall not be compelled 'to testify as an adverse party or
witness.' "82
B. Privileged Communications
Section 9-105 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Code Annotated provides that husbands and wives are
incompetent to testify to any confidential communication that
occurred between them during their marriage.8 3 The statute does
not define the phrase "confidential communication," nor does it
list any exceptions. Furthermore, the legislature's use of the word
"incompetent" raises questions as to the possibility of waiver.8 4
By resorting to the common law, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has resolved some of the questions raised by the ambi-
guity of the statute. The court follows the generally accepted rule
that any communication between husband and wife made during
the marriage is presumed privileged. 5 The presumption of confi-
dentiality may be overcome, however, by evidence that a third
79. Article 27, § 11A of the Maryland Annotated Code subjects a person responsible for
the supervision of a child, who causes injury by his malicious mistreatment of that
child, to criminal liability for child abuse. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A (1976). The
court did not believe that the legislature could have intended to limit the compellabil-
ity of a spouse's testimony to prosecution for abuse under that statute. 6 Md. App.
600, 615-17, 252 A.2d 476, 485 (1969).
80. 6 Md. App. 600, 615-17, 252 A.2d 476, 485 (1969); see MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 1lA
(1976).
81. 9 Md. App. 15, 262 A.2d 331 (1970).
82. 1I at 19, 262 A.2d at 333 (emphasis in original).
83. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1980).
84. Law of August 22, 1973, ch. 2, § 9-106, 1973 Md. Laws Sp. Sess. 284 (revisor's note).
See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
85. Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 543, 380 A.2d 49, 52 (1977).
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party was made privy to the communication. s6 The court of
appeals has justified its application of the privilege by asserting:
(1) that the communications originate in confidence, (2)
the confidence is essential to the relation, (3) the relation
is a proper object of encouragement by the law, and (4) the
injury that would inure to it by the disclosure is probably
greater than the benefit that would result in the judicial
investigation of truth.
7
To compare the traditional and liberal views of what con-
stitutes a privileged communication, one need look no further
than the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland. In Gutridge v. State,"' the court of
appeals held that a spouse must intend to convey information to
engage in a confidential communication. In Gutridge, a husband
attempted to foreclose his wife from testifying that he had placed
a key to a locker containing narcotics in her purse. The court of
appeals concluded that the dropping of his keys in her handbag
could not be considered a communication. Observing that no infor-
mation was transmitted along with the act, the court believed
that, even viewed liberally, the privilege would not apply.89
Although the court of appeals did not affirmatively state that it
would be unwilling to view an act as a communication in future
cases, based on Gutridge, it appears unlikely that the privilege
will be extended to acts that are unaccompanied by oral or written
expressions conveying some information.
In Coleman v. State,90 the defendant's wife testified, over his
objection, to the substance of a telephone call from him after he
had been arrested for perverted sexual practices. Gloria McCue,
another prosecution witness who had been present during the
crime, testified that she had placed a ring, stolen from the victim,
in Coleman's apartment at his request. Mrs. Coleman revealed at
trial that her husband, fearing that the ring would be used as
evidence against him, phoned her from jail requesting that she
recover it from his apartment. After the defendant's wife obtained
possession of the ring, she turned it over to the police.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Coleman's
86. See ic at 543, 380 A.2d at 53; Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 516, 204 A.2d 557, 559
(1964); Master v. Master, 223 Md. 618, 166 A.2d 251 (1960). In Master, a wife was per-
mitted to testify to a statement made by her husband in the presence of their children
who were old enough to fully understand what was being said. The fact that they
were able to overhear the conversation rebutted the presumption that the marital
communication was confidential and privileged. See icL at 623-24, 166 A.2d at 256.
87. Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 541, 380 A.2d 49, 51-52 (1977).
88. 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964).
89. Id at 516, 204 A.2d at 559.
90. 35 Md. App. 208, 370 A.2d 174, rev'd, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977).
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conviction, concluding that the communication between the defen-
dant and his wife was not privileged."1 The decision was based on
the court's belief that the telephone conversation was not
intended to be confidential,92 that the relationship between the
couple did not constitute a marriage worthy of protection, 93 and
that the privilege did not apply when the communication was
made in furtherance of a crime.
94
The court of appeals reversed, holding that there had been
insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that the com-
munication was privileged.95 Furthermore, the court indicated
that the application of the privilege is not dependent upon the
stability of the marriage. Finally, although other jurisdictions
statutorily provide that a marital communication is not privileged
when made in furtherance of a crime,96 the court refused to adopt
that exception without legislative sanction.97 To the contrary, the
nature of the discussion between Coleman and his wife indicated
to the court that the communication was intended to be confi-
dential.9
Three months before the court of appeals rendered its decision
in Coleman,99 the court of special appeals decided Harris v.
State. 00 The trial record in that case indicated that the defendant
had been informed that a relationship existed between his wife
and a man named Smith. Mrs. Harris testified that her husband
threatened her into disclosing where Smith lived. She further
revealed that after the defendant procured his shotgun, she drove
him to Smith's home in her car, at which time her husband told her
to pull over in front of his residence and blow the horn. After she
jumped from the car, a gun battle allegedly took place. 10 Mr. Har-
ris was convicted of assault with intent to murder and of carrying
a dangerous weapon openly with intent to injure. 10 2
91. Id
92. The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland found the telephone conversation not to be
confidential because Gloria McCue was privy to the details concerning the ring, and
Mrs. Coleman would have needed to contact her to obtain it. Id at 212-14, 370 A.2d
at 177-78.
93. Mrs. Coleman testified that her marriage to the appellant was "completely a business
arrangement" to entitle her child to support payments after Coleman's anticipated
enlistment in the army. Id at 214, 370 A.2d at 178.
94. Id at 214-16, 307 A.2d at 178-79.
95. 281 Md. 538, 544, 380 A.2d 49, 53 (1977).
96. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 981 (West 1966), cited in Coleman v. State, 35 Md. App. 208,
216, 370 A.2d 174, 179, rev'd, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977).
97. 281 Md. 538, 546-47, 380 A.2d 49, 54-55 (1977).
98. Id at 544, 380 A.2d at 53.
99. The court of appeals' decision in Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977),
was rendered on December 8, 1977.
100. 37 Md. App. 180, 376 A.2d 1144 (1977). Harris was decided by the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland on September 8, 1977.
101. Id at 182-83, 376 A.2d at 1144-45.
102. Id at 181, 376 A.2d at 1144.
34919811
Baltimore Law Review
On appeal, Harris asserted that the trial court had erred in
admitting his wife's testimony concerning the conversation
between them before and during their drive to the victim's
home. 103 The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction, hold-
ing that the statute protecting confidential communications is
inapplicable in the case of threatening statements because such
statements are inherently destructive of the marital harmony and
tranquility the statute seeks to preserve. 10 4 A petition for cer-
tiorari to the court of appeals was never made.
It is questionable whether the court of appeals would have
affirmed the holding in Harris, based on its later reversal of the
court of special appeals' decision in Coleman v. State.105 In Cole-
man, the court of appeals indicated that "a court may not as a
general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain
language of a statute or insert exceptions not made by the
legislature. 1 06 The court was convinced that if any exceptions
under the statute on privileged communications had been
intended, the legislature would have expressed them, as has been
done with other statutory privileges. 0 7 Consequently, the Harris
exception in the case of threatening statements by a spouse is of
questionable validity.
It should be noted, however, that Harris and Coleman are dis-
tinguishable, and it is possible that the court of appeals, if given
the opportunity, might have affirmed the Harris decision on other
grounds. In Coleman, the defendant revealed to his wife the loca-
tion of incriminating evidence, clearly intending the communica-
tion with her to be confidential. °8 The only way the court of
special appeals could affirm the admission of her testimony was to
fashion an exception to the statute, thereby invading the prov-
ince of the legislature and subjecting its decision to reversal by
the court of appeals. On the other hand, in Harris, the defendant's
communicative intent was less clear. In coercing his wife to direct
him to the victim's home, he was not imparting a confidential mat-
ter, but forcing her to reveal such information. In doing so, he was
103. Harris contended that the conversations between his wife and himself were protected
under § 9-105 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code Annotated. Id at 183, 376
A.2d at 1145. That statute provides: "One spouse is not competent to disclose any
confidential communication between the spouses occurring during their marriage."
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1980).
104. 37 Md. App. 180, 185, 376 A.2d 1144, 1146 (1977).
105. 281 Md. 538, 380 A.2d 49 (1977).
106. Id at 546, 380 A.2d at 54.
107. The court noted that the Maryland legislature had expressly stated exceptions to
both the psychiatrist-patient and attorney-client privileges. See MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 9-109, -110(b) (1980), cited in Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538,
546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977).
108. See text accompanying note 98 supra
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not relying on the sanctity of the marital relationship; he was act-
ing to destroy it.109 Although finding precedent for exceptions to
the statute in its prior decision in Coleman, "0 the court of special
appeals in Harris also discussed whether the defendant's threat-
ening statements fell within the definition of the statutorily unde-
fined phrase "confidential communications.""' Based on Gut-
ridge,12 the court could conceivably have concluded that the
threatening statements made by Harris to his wife were not
intended to convey any information to her and, thereby, were not
subject to protection under the statute.
Neither the legislature nor the courts of Maryland have ad-
dressed the issue of waiver with respect to confidential communi-
cations. There would appear to be no reason to preclude one
marital partner from revealing the substance of a conversation
with the other in a case in which the communicating spouse has
consented to the disclosure. The choice of the term "incompetent"
rather than "privileged" in the statute on confidential communi-
cations, however, raises doubts as to the possibilities of such
waiver.
11 3
IV. SPOUSAL TESTIMONY IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
Any definitive statement as to the admissibility of spousal
testimony in the Fourth Circuit is difficult to make, by virtue of
the limited number of decisions made by the court of appeals on
the issue and the lack of specificity in the federal rule governing
privilege.1 4 While some guidance as to the applicability of an anti-
marital facts privilege can be found in the Supreme Court's 1980
decision, Trammel v. United States, "5 the Supreme Court has pro-
vided no recent precedent defining the scope of privileged marital
communications. 1 6
109. See Dowdy v. State, 194 Tenn. 212, 250 S.W.2d 78 (1952); text accompanying note 50
supra.
110. Although the court of special appeals cited the following authorities: Gutridge v.
State, 236 Md. 514, 204 A.2d 557 (1964); People v. Fields, 31 N.Y.2d 713, 289 N.E.2d
557, 337 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1972); Wheeler v. State, 220 Tenn. 155, 415 S.W.2d 121 (1967),
the court apparently relied on its prior holding in Coleman to support its decision. See
Harris v. State, 37 Md. App. 180, 184, 376 A.2d 1144, 1146 (1977). Furthermore, the
Gutridge passage, quoted by the Harris court, was taken out of context and did not,
as the court of special appeals stated, indicate the court of appeals' approval of
"relaxing the strict rule rendering spouses incompetent to testify with respect to con-
fidential communications ... " Id Compare Gutridge v. State, 236 Md. 514, 517, 204
A.2d 557, 559 (1964) with Harris v. State, 37 Md. App. 180, 184, 376 A.2d 1144, 1146
(1977).
111. Harris v. State, 37 Md. App. 180, 182-83, 376 A.2d 1144, 1146 (1977).
112. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
113. Law of August 22, 1973, ch. 2, § 9-106, 1973 Md. Laws Sp. Sess. 284 (revisor's note).
114. See text accompanying notes 139-41 infra.
115. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
116. See text accompanying note 192 infra.
19811
Baltimore Law Review
A. Anti-Marital Facts Privilege
Relying on early Supreme Court decisions,117 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit originally disquali-
fied one spouse from testifying for or against the other."8 In
Dowdy v. United States,119 the wife of a criminal defendant, ac-
cused of conspiring to violate the prohibition laws, was disquali-
fied from testifying on behalf of her husband or his alleged co-con-
spirator. The court reasoned that it was bound to observe the rule
of spousal incompetence, "so long deemed settled," until the
Supreme Court ruled otherwise.
120
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, this Fourth Circuit case,
renamed Funk v. United States,'2 ' resulted in the abrogation of
spousal incompetence. The Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he
public policy of one generation may not, under changed condi-
tions, be the public policy of another.... The fundamental basis
upon which all rules of evidence must rest - if they are to rest
upon reason - is their adaptation to the successful development
of the truth.' ' 22 Absent federal legislation to the contrary, the
Court held that the favorable testimony of a witness-spouse could
no longer be viewed as incompetent. The Funk Court gave no indi-
cation, however, whether and under what conditions adverse
spousal testimony would be admissible.
23
Subsequent to the Funk opinion, decisions on the admissibil-
ity of spousal testimony varied from one federal jurisdiction to
another.124 Consequently, in 1958 the Supreme Court in Hawkins
v. United States 2' rendered its first clear-cut ruling on the issue.
In Hawkins, the trial court had allowed a wife to testify, over her
husband's objection, that he had transported a girl over state lines
for the purposes of prostitution, in violation of the Mann Act.
126
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Government argued that
although one spouse should not be compelled to testify against
the other, the testimony should be admitted when offered volun-
tarily by the witness-spouse. 127 It was asserted that when a hus-
band or wife is willing to so testify, it is a strong indication that
117. E.g., Jin Fuey Moy v. United States, 254 U.S. 189 (1920); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
118. See Fisher v. United States, 32 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1929); Barton v. United States,
25 F.2d 967,967 (4th Cir. 1928); Krashowitz v. United States, 282 F. 599, 601 (4th Cir.
1922).
119. 46 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1931), rev'd sub nom. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
120. Id at 421.
121. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
122. Id at 381.
123. The Court in Funk limited its ruling to favorable spousal testimony. See id at 373.
124. Compare United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 794 (1944) with Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
125. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
126. Id at 74-75.
127. Id at 77.
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the marriage, which the rule seeks to preserve, is no longer worthy
of protection. Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that
the exclusion by one spouse of the other's adverse testimony bene-
fited not only the family involved, but the public as well. Further-
more, the Court failed to see how family harmony would be less
disturbed by a wife's voluntary testimony against her husband
than by her compelled testimony.'28 Although concluding that a
witness-spouse's testimony was not admissible over the objection
of an accused-spouse, the court noted that the decision was not
intended to foreclose future changes in the rule, which might
"eventually be dictated by 'reason and experience.' '129
The Hawkins decision indicated that the common law dis-
qualification had evolved into a rule barring the testimony of one
spouse against the other without their mutual consent.'3 0 The
Supreme Court provided additional support for the view that
either spouse had standing to claim the privilege against adverse
testimony in Wyatt v. United States.'31 In that case, the Court
stated that "[wihile the defendant-husband is entitled to be pro-
tected against condemnation through the wife's testimony, the
witness-wife is also entitled to be protected against becoming the
instrument of that condemnation, - the sentiment in each case
being equal in degree and yet different in quality.'
32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
went one step further in Mills v. United States, 33 by concluding
that a witness-spouse could not be compelled by the accused to
give even allegedly favorable testimony in a criminal case against
him. Citing Hawkins, the court reasoned that because the wife of
the accused stated that she did not wish to testify either for or
against her husband, the trial court would have been "treading on
dangerous ground" in compelling her testimony.'3 4 It has been




129. 1I at 79. Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934), was the first case to establish
that the competency of witnesses in the federal courts is to be "governed by common
law principles as interpreted and applied... in the light of reason and experience." Id
at 12. This standard was adopted in both rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure and rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
130. 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958).
131. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
132. Id. at 529 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2241).
133. 281 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1960).
134. Id at 740. Both Hawkins and Wyatt spoke only to the witness-spouse's privilege
against adverse spousal testimony. Mills did not mention Wyat4 which was decided
three months earlier.
135. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 405, at 83-84 n.9 (1969). Although
at trial Ms. Mills based her refusal to testify on spousal privilege, the trial court ad-
vised her that she need not testify if her testimony might incriminate her. Mills v.
United States, 281 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1960). Professor Wright, in his criticism of
the Mills decision, indicated that the privilege against self-incrimination provided a
sounder basis for allowing Ms. Mills to avoid testifying. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 405, at 83-84 n.9 (1969).
19811
354 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 10
In 1972, the Supreme Court promulgated a proposed draft of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, including detailed rules on
privilege, for congressional approval.13 6 Proposed rule 505 would
have excluded spousal testimony in criminal proceedings when
the privilege was invoked by a defendant or by the witness-spouse
on his behalf.,3" The latter was presumed to have the consent of
the accused "in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 13 8 The
specific privilege rules, however, including rule 505, were rejected
by Congress in favor of a general provision, rule 501.119 Pursuant
to this rule, for the most part,14 0 state law is to be applied in diver-
sity cases, and in federal question cases the courts are to apply
"the principals of common law as they may be interpreted... in
the light of reason and experience. ''141
In February 1980, the Supreme Court was presented with the
same argument that it had previously rejected in Hawkins to sup-
port the admission of a Witness-spouse's voluntary testimony.
Trammel v. United States1 42 concerned the involvement of a hus-
band, wife, and others in the importation of heroin.143 After the
Government granted Mrs. Trammel use immunity, she testified
136. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §§
501-513 (1979); Nacht, Privileges in the Federal Courts - The Two Faces of Rule 501,
1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 493, 493-94.
137. 56 F.R.D. 183, 244 (1973).
138. Id
139. Rule 501 reads as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the prin-
ciples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which
State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in
accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.
140. In a diversity case in which no federal claim is involved, state privilege rules are ap-
plied. In a federal question case, which raises no state issues, the court resorts to
federal privilege law. In a "mixed case," however, the controlling law is less clear. For
a thorough discussion of this topic, see Nacht, Privileges in the Federal Courts - The
Two Faces of Rule 501, 1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 493, 496-502.
141. FED. R. EVID. 501. See note 139 supra.
142. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
143. Petitioner Otis Trammel was indicted on March 10, 1976, along with Edwin Lee
Roberts and Joseph Freeman, for importing heroin from Thailand and the Philippine
Islands and conspiring to import heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 962(a) and
963. Petitioner's wife, Elizabeth Trammel, and six others were named as unindicted
co-conspirators. It was alleged that the petitioner and his wife in August 1975 carried
a quantity of heroin with them on a flight from the Philippines to California. Follow-
ing Freeman and Roberts' assistance of the couple in distribution, Elizabeth Tram-
mel purchased an additional supply of the drug in Thailand. On her return flight to
the United States, during a routine customs search in Hawaii, four ounces of heroin
were found on her person, and she was arrested. 445 U.S. 40, 42 (1980).
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concerning the role of herself and her spouse in the illegal activi-
ties charged.'" The only limitation placed on her testimony at trial
was that she could not relate any information that she had ob-
tained by virtue of a confidential communication with her hus-
band.145 He was thereafter convicted based almost entirely on her
testimony.1 46 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed, rejecting Trammel's assertion that, based on
Hawkins, his wife's adverse testimony should not have been
admitted over his objection.1 47 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and overruled its prior decision in Hawkins, concluding
that "reason and experience no longer justifqied] so sweeping a
rule .... 4
Recognizing that testimonial exclusionary rules contravene
the public's right to every man's evidence, the Court examined the
rationales previously espoused in support of the anti-marital facts
privilege.14 The early disqualification, based on the legal unity of
husband and wife, was rejected as having no contemporary justifi-
cation.1 50 The modern theory that spousal testimony should be ex-
cluded to foster the harmony and sanctity of the marital relation-
ship was also discarded. The Court concluded that the willingness
of one spouse to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding
indicates that there is probably little marital harmony to
preserve. 15 Furthermore, the Court believed that allowing an ac-
cused to foreclose his spouse from testifying in a case in which she
was allegedly involved in the crime could in itself damage the rela-
tionship by depriving her of the ability to obtain immunity from
prosecution in return for her cooperation.1 5
A comparison was made between the testimonial exclusionary
rules for spouses and those the federal courts recognize in the rela-
tionships of attorney-client, priest-penitent, and physician-
patient. In contrast to the expansive scope of the spousal
privileges, the latter privileges were noted to be restricted to infor-
mation obtained in confidential communications.153 The Court was
144. 445 U.S. 40, 42-43 (1980).
145. Before trial, petitioner moved to sever his case from that of Freeman and Roberts,
based on his privilege to prevent his wife, whom the government intended to call as
an adverse witness, from testifying. After a hearing on the motion, the district court
ruled that Mrs. Trammel could testify "to any act she observed during the marriage
and to any communications 'made in the presence of a third person'; however, con-
fidential communications between petitioner and his wife were held to be privileged
and inadmissible." Id
146. Id at 43.
147. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), afrd, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
148. 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980).
149. Id at 50-53.
150. The Court stated that "[nlo longer is the female destined solely for the home and rear-
ing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas." Id at
52 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975)).
151. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
152. 445 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1980).
153. Id at 51.
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unwilling, however, to circumscribe spousal privilege to the same
extent. Nevertheless, the Trammel Court decided that the time
had come for the federal courts to follow the modern trend, by ad-
mitting the voluntary testimony of a witness-spouse when the in-
formation disclosed was not obtained in privileged marital com-
munications. 54
The Supreme Court in Trammel did not discuss under what
circumstances a court might be able to compel the testimony of a
witness-spouse. Prior to Trammel, however, in Lutwak v. United
States" and Wyatt v. United States, "16 the Court had placed two
limitations on an accused's ability to prevent his spouse from
testifying.
In Lutwak, three aliens had married United States citizens
solely to obtain entry into the country under the War Brides
Act."17 None of the parties ever intended to live together as hus-
band and wife, but rather, once their purpose was accomplished,
they planned to terminate the marriages."58 The wives testified at
trial to their husbands' conspiracy to defraud the United States in
violation of the immigration laws. The Supreme Court affirmed
the admissibility of that testimony by stating that when a mar-
riage is a sham, without marital harmony for the privilege to pre-
serve, the accused should not be permitted to invoke its protec-
tion.1
59
In Wyatt v. United States, 60 the defendant was charged with
violating the Mann Act, by knowingly transporting a woman
across state lines for the purposes of prostitution. After the
offense, the accused married the victim who testified unwillingly
at trial. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's compelling of
the witness' testimony, based on the belief that "a prostituted
witness wife" was necessarily made subject to the will of her hus-
band, as evidenced by his ability to have induced her into a life of
prostitution. 6' Consequently, it was reasoned that the victim's
decision not to testify was probably based on her husband's influ-
ence over her.12 The Court did not go so far as to conclude that
such testimony could be compelled in any trial for an offense by
one spouse against the other. Rather, the Wyatt court limited its
154. The Court concluded that "vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse [would further]
the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening
legitimate law enforcement needs." Id- at 53.
155. 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
156. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
157. 344 U.S. 604, 606 (1953).
158. Id at 606-09.
159. I at 615.
160. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
161. Id at 530.
162. Id at 530-31.
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decision, holding merely that testimony could be compelled from a
spouse who, prior to the marriage, had been the victim of her hus-
band's Mann Act violation. 1
6
3
It is unclear under what circumstances the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit will permit the district
courts to compel one spouse to testify against the other. When a
husband and wife were incompetent to testify for or against each
other, the federal courts recognized an exception for certain
offenses committed by the accused against his spouse.164 Other
than the narrow Wyatt decision, however, there is no binding
precedent dealing with this exception and little indication whether
such spousal testimony, considered competent under the common
law, will now be viewed as compellable.
Although the Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence were rejected by Congress, this does not negate the possibil-
ity that federal courts might view the proposed exceptions to the
rule on the anti-marital facts privilege as persuasive authority in
future cases.' 65 Under that rule, the circumstances in which a de-
fendant could not prevent his spouse from testifying against him
were as follows:
(1) in proceedings in which one spouse is charged with a
crime against the person or property of the other or of a
child of either, or with a crime against the person or prop-
erty of a third person committed in the course of commit-
ting a crime against the other, or (2) as to matters occur-
ring prior to the marriage, or (3) in proceedings in which a
spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution
or other immoral purpose .... with transporting a female
in interstate commerce for immoral purposes .... or with
violation of other similar statutes.
1 6
It should be noted, however, that the proposed rule vested the
privilege in the accused-spouse. 67 Consequently, some of the
aforementioned exceptions may not be as readily accepted as a
basis for compelling the unwilling testimony of a witness-spouse.
Prior to Trammel, the Fourth Circuit discussed exceptions to
the anti-marital facts privilege in United States v. Shipp. "18 In that
case, a member of the armed services was charged with having
sexual relations with his minor stepdaughter. Shipp's wife was
never called upon to testify for either the Government or the de-
fense. Nevertheless, the court noted that it was an open question
163. Id at 531.
164. Stein v. Bowvman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 221 (1839).
165. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 501103], at 501-26 to -27
(1979).
166. 56 F.R.D. 183, 244-45 (1973).
167. See text accompanying notes 137-38 supra.
168. 409 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1969).
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in federal courts as to whether, in such a case, a spouse would be a
competent witness.1 69 Broadly interpreting Wyatt, the court
stated that in the federal judicial system, no privilege could be
asserted by a defendant when the victim of the offense was his
spouse. 170 It was also noted that many state courts have extended
this exception to include an offense against the child of either
spouse.1 71 Furthermore, the court mentioned that under the pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, the privilege could not be
claimed in such cases.1 72 The Fourth Circuit was not called upon in
Shipp to decide whether one spouse could be forced to testify
against the other and did not do so, even in dicta. Absent conflict-
ing future precedent, however, it would appear from the language
employed by the Shipp court that the Fourth Circuit might com-
pel such testimony in a case in which the spouse of the accused or
the child of either is a victim of the crime charged.
B. Privileged Communications
Although courts within the Fourth Circuit have recognized
that confidential marital communications are privileged, 17 ap-
parently the court of appeals has not yet defined the scope of this
privilege.174 Therefore, analogous to the approach to the anti-
marital facts privilege, one must turn to Supreme Court cases for
guidance. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court first
voiced its acceptance of the privilege protecting confidential com-
munications, on policy grounds. 171 It was not until the mid-
twentieth century, however, that the Court defined its scope in
Wolfle v. United States, 176 Blau v. United States, 177 and Pereira v.
United States."17
In Wolfle, the accused dictated an incriminating letter to be
sent to his wife. His stenographer testified at trial from the notes
she had taken prior to transcribing the dictation.179 On certiorari
169. Id at 35 n.3.
170. Id
171. Id
172. Id; see text accompanying note 166 supra.
173. See, e.g., Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F. Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979).
174. The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Burton has held, however, that privileged
marital communications may be included in a presentence report. Relying on Tram-
me, the Burton court concluded that only the spouse's testimony in the courtroom is
prohibited. 631 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1980).
175. In the Supreme Court case, Hopkins v. Grimshaw, 165 U.S. 342 (1897), it was decided
that the widow of the decedent, whose trust property was the subject of the litiga-
tion, was incompetent to testify to a conversation with her husband that had
occurred during their marriage. Even though the bar of incompetency had been
removed in most cases, the Court concluded that the law was inapplicable to spouses
"upon grounds of public policy." Id at 349.
176. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
177. 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
178. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
179. See 64 F.2d 566, 566 (9th Cir.), affl'd, 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
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to the Supreme Court, Wolfle asserted that his stenographer
should have been excluded from testifying on the same grounds
that an attorney's clerk or physician's nurse is precluded from
testifying to otherwise privileged information.180 This argument
was rejected based on the Court's belief that, contrary to the phy-
sician-patient or attorney-client relationship, reason and conve-
nience do not demand the extension of the privilege to third parties
in order to protect confidential communications between husband
and wife."" The Court stated that
[ciommunications between .. .spouses, privately made,
are generally assumed to have been intended to be confi-
dential, and hence they are privileged; but wherever a
communication, because of its nature or the circum-
stances under which it was made, was obviously not in-
tended to be confidential it is not a privileged communica-
tion.... And, when made in the presence of a third party,
such communications are usually regarded as not privi-
leged because not made in confidence.
182
The Court, however, refrained from commenting on whether,
under similar facts to those in Wolfle, the wife's testimony would
also have been permitted over her husband's objection. 183
The presumption that marital communications are privileged
was reasserted in Blau v. United States. 8 In Blau, the petitioner,
relying on his privilege not to relate confidential marital communi-
cations, refused to reveal the whereabouts of his wife, who was
wanted as a witness in a grand jury investigation of Communist
Party activities in Colorado. 85 Consequently, he was sentenced to
imprisonment for contempt, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.1 86 On certiorari to the
Supreme Court, the Government argued that the privilege could
not be claimed by the petitioner, because he had failed to establish
that the information was privately conveyed.187 This assertion, in
the Court's opinion, ignored the rule previously asserted in Wolfle
that marital communications are "presumptively confidential. "188
Moreover, observing that several witnesses who appeared were in-
carcerated for contempt, the Court commented that it was "highly
probable" that any communication by Mrs. Blau revealing her
location to her husband was intended to be confidential. 89
180. 291 U.S. 7, 15-16 (1934).
181. Id. at 16-17.
182. Id at 14.
183. Id. at 17.
184. 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
185. Id at 333.
186. 179 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1950), af'd, 340 U.S. 332 (1951).
187. 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
188. Id
189. Id at 334.
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In Pereira v. United States,°90 the Supreme Court indicated
that evidence might be introduced to rebut the presumption that
a marital communication is privileged. None of the communica-
tions to which the wife of the accused testified in that case were
deemed to be privileged because they either occurred prior to the
marriage, were made in the presence of third parties, or related to
acts rather than oral or written expressions. 191
Although the above Supreme Court cases apparently convey
a clear picture of the applicability and scope of privileged marital
communications for the federal courts to follow, it should be noted
that the most recent Supreme Court case on confidential commu-
nications, Pereira, was decided over twenty-five years ago.
Moreover, the 1972 Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence recognized no such privilege.192 Consequently, it is
unclear whether "reason and experience" might convince the
Court to alter its application of the privilege in future cases.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Trammel 93 and district
courts within the Fourth Circuit' have recognized, at least in
dicta, the continued validity of the privilege protecting confiden-
tial marital communications.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the few rules of evidence espoused by laymen is that a
wife may not testify against her husband. In recent years, one
state legislature after another has limited the application of this
rule. For a century, Maryland and the majority of federal courts
differed in the limitations they imposed on spousal testimony. As
a result of Trammel4 however, these courts now concur that, on
matters not solely disclosed in confidential communications, one
spouse can normally neither be compelled nor foreclosed from
testifying against the other. The only possible area of disagree-
190. 347 U.S. 1 (1954).
191. Id. at 6-7.
192. The advisory committee notes to the proposed rules rationalized the committee's
rejection of this privilege by stating-
The traditional justifications for privileges not to testify against a spouse
and not to be testified against by one's spouse have been the prevention of
marital dissension and the repugnancy of requiring a person to condemn or
be condemned by his spouse .... These considerations bear no relevancy to
marital communications. Nor can it be assumed that marital conduct will be
affected by a privilege for confidential communications of whose existence
the parties in all likelihood are unaware. The other communication privi-
leges, by way of contrast, have as one party a professional person who can be
expected to inform the other of the existence o 1 the privilege. Moreover, the
relationships from which those privileges arise are essentially and almost
exclusively verbal in nature, quite unlike marriage.
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 505[3], at 505-13 (1979).
193. 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
194. E.g., Smith v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 473 F.Supp. 572, 585 (D. Md. 1979).
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ment between Maryland and the Fourth Circuit may arise on the
issue of whether a spouse can be compelled to testify when he was
the victim of the crime charged.
Changing views on marriage and the individual rights of
marital partners have greatly altered the legal rights and obliga-
tions of family members in the past decade. The decreasing exclu-
sion of spousal testimony is but one more step in a long overdue
reexamination by courts and legislatures of their special treat-
ment of family members, which affords judicial protection at the
expense of valuable evidence.
Marleen Bleich Miller
